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RISK OF ECONOMIC LOSS AND IMPLIED
WARRANTY LIABILITY IN TRIPARTITE
FINANCE LEASES
JUDY L. WOODS*
I. INTRODUCTION
During recent years, business leasing has become more prevalent.
Leasing is often preferred for accounting and tax reasons. The desire to use
equipment on a short-term basis without incurring capital expenditures, the
desire to avoid responsibility for maintenance and related costs, or the de-
sire to keep pace with rapid technological change by leasing state-of-the-art
equipment are reasons more and more businesses use leases to procure
needed equipment, machinery, computer and communications systems, and
vehicles.
Although leasing offers many economic and business advantages,1 un-
fortunately, risks exist for the lessee. When equipment is found to be inade-
quate or defective, the lessee may find that neither the lessor nor the equip-
ment vendor or manufacturer is willing to accept responsibility. This article
will explore recent Indiana cases relating to remedies available to the equip-
ment lessee for economic loss under tort and contract law for breach of
warranty.' Problems related to application of Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) provisions and privity requirements also will be discussed.
The typical pattern in a tripartite finance leases begins with a vendor
or seller of equipment such as computer systems, electronic equipment, ve-
hicles, or heavy equipment and machinery. Usually because of considera-
tions regarding capital resources, cash flow, or tax planning, the lessee de-
* Macalester College (B.A.); Bryn Mawr College (M.A., 1978); Indiana University, In-
dianapolis (J.D., 1987). Attorney, Kroger, Gardis & Regas, Indianapolis, Indiana.
1. Discussion of accounting and tax treatment of leases is beyond the scope of this
article.
2. This article is limited to a discussion of economic loss in personal property lease trans-
actions and will not discuss strict liability in tort imposed on lessors and/or equipment manu-
facturers where personal injury or property damage results from defective equipment.
3. The term "tripartite finance lease" is used herein to describe the mechanism whereby
a lessee obtains equipment from a financial institution or other lender as lessor of the equip-
ment. The lessor obtains the equipment by purchase from a third party vendor. There are
always three parties involved: lessee, lessor, and vendor, as well as two contracts: a sales con-
tract and a lease.
Woods: Risk of Economic Loss and Implied Warranty Liability in Tripartit
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
594 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
cides that a lease or a lease with an option to purchase is a better means of
obtaining needed equipment. A bank, leasing company, or other lending
institution provides the necessary funds, most often by purchasing the
equipment from the seller and then entering into a lease purchase agree-
ment with the lessee.
In the routine tripartite lease situation, a contract exists between the
lessor and the seller for the purchase of the equipment; a lease agreement
exists between the lessor and the lessee covering the amount and terms of
the financing. There is no contract between the equipment seller and the
lessee, who is the ultimate user and consumer of the equipment. There is no
single agreement which ties the obligation to pay for the equipment to the
user's performance expectations for the equipment. Although the necessary
elements for applying U.C.C. warranty theory and common law contract
remedies exist, they are not found in a configuration which permits their
application. When the equipment fails to perform as expected by the lessee,
resulting in loss of bargain or other economic injury to the lessee's business
or enterprise, the juxtaposition of buyer and seller roles among the three
parties results in an inequitable situation. Even without injury, the lessor
has remedies against the seller, while the lessee has injury without the rem-
edies. The seller has failed to perform under the terms of his or her con-
tract, yet has no liability to the injured party.
This article will first discuss the general nature of lease transactions
and risk of loss for economic damages. The application of U.C.C. provisions
to leases, specific U.C.C. warranty provisions, and privity requirements for
applying warranty remedies will then be discussed. Finally, two exceptions
to privity requirements, based on theories of agency and participation in the
transaction, will be discussed as a means for providing warranty remedies to
the lessee in a tripartite finance lease.
II. NATURE OF LEASE TRANSACTIONS
Numerous authors have struggled to characterize the nature of lease
transactions, particularly in relationship to sales and bailments.4 Some have
gone so far as to conclude that "there is no intelligible border between sale
and lease.' ' The value of pigeonholing leases as distinct from other kinds of
transactions depends on the context of other legal and business issues in-
volved.6 For example, ownership and title are important in taxation and
4. See, e.g., A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION IN-
VITATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASING: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR A
UNIFORM STATUTE (1983); J. Ayer, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 667 (1983).
5. Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 341, 345.
6. Boss, Leases and Sales: Neer or Where Shall the Twain Meet?, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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bankruptcy contexts where it becomes essential to determine how much of
and to whom an interest in the property was transferred by the lease. Ques-
tions of perfection and rights upon repossession take on different dimensions
when a lease is viewed as a financing device, installment sale, or secured
transaction.
Most comparisons of leases and sales have placed heavy emphasis on
analysis of the distribution of economic risks and benefits between the
lessee/buyer and the lessor/seller. 7 The issues which are critical to this in-
quiry are the nature of implied warranty liability, such as that found in
Article 2 of the U.C.C., to be applied to the lessor and the effect of lack of
privity between the lessee and the equipment supplier or manufacturer in
the typical tripartite finance lease situation.
Lease transactions should be differentiated on the basis of the role of
the lessor.8 A vendor lessor is in the business of supplying equipment for
lease or for lease and sale. The vendor lessor may maintain an inventory of
equipment and often provides other services such as maintenance, service,
and repair for the equipment. Vendor lessors may provide equipment on a
short or long-term basis, but often expect the return of the leased item
before the end of its useful life so that it may be leased again and again.
A finance lessor is in the business of providing funds to lessees who
desire to procure property by means of a lease. Finance lessors are not the
direct providers of the equipment. There is always a third party involved
from whom the equipment is obtained on behalf of the lessee. Finance les-
sors perform different functions from those of vendor lessors. Recognizing
that finance lessors generally provide funding and credit-related services
which are consistent with the terms of the charters of national banks, the
court in M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First National Bank explained
the role of a national bank acting as a finance lessor:
[Glenerally the customer calls the bank directly and expresses
an interest in leasing particular personal property. This contact
essentially is to inquire about the availability of credit. The bank
performs no procurement function. The customer chooses the
property he wishes to lease, selects a vendor and negotiates with
him the terms of the purchase. Assuming the bank finds the cus-
tomer an acceptable credit risk, it then purchases the property
357, 368.
7. See, e.g., Fraser, Application of Strict Tort Liability to the Leasing Industry: A
Closer Look, 34 Bus. LAW. 605 (1979). But cf Henszey, Application of Strict Tort Liability
to the Leasing Industry, 33 Bus. LAW. 631 (1978).
8. Carlin, Product Liability for the Equipment Lessor? Merchant-Lessor versus Fi-
nance-Lessor, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 847 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman 2d
ed. Supps. 1980, 1983).
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and leases it to the customer. Delivery by the seller is made di-
rectly to the customer-lessee who makes the lease payments to
the bank.9
Arguments for imposing strict tort liability on and applying U.C.C.
warranty provisions to lessors frequently point out the similarities between
lessors and sellers: both inject the subject property into the stream of com-
merce and fully participate in the chain of distribution.'0 In addition, both
are in a position to absorb the effect of losses from liability as a cost of
doing business."
Two other important reasons for imposing strict tort or implied war-
ranty liability on sellers do not apply to finance lessors. First, finance lessors
have little if any contact with the equipment being leased. 2 They are not in
a position to affect changes in product design, packaging, promotion, or in
any other way to alter products in response to liability problems. Second,
because they are not the direct distributors or promoters of the equipment,
it is unlikely that lessees place the kind of consumer reliance on lessors that
buyers place on sellers in the ordinary course of business.' These differ-
ences will be discussed in greater detail below. Given the large number of
lease transactions, analogous treatment of leases as compared to sales and
other commercial transactions is problematic. Not only are leases treated
differently in various jurisdictions, 4 but there is also differing treatment as
to who is a proper plaintiff and a proper defendant depending on the nature
of the damage or injury involved.'
The law in Indiana is well-settled regarding liability for personal injury
9. 563 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1977).
10. Fraser, supra note 7, at 610-12 and cases cited therein. See also, Gilbert v. Stone
City Constr. Co., 171 Ind. Ct. App. 418, 357 N.E.2d 738 (1977).
11. While products liability decisions such as Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.
2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897 (1962), recognize that the loss spreading rationale is support for finding liability, the
mere existence of a deep pocket somewhere is not a fair basis for imposing liability. Fraser,
supra note 7, at 614. See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98 (5th ed. 1984).
12. M & M Leasing, 563 F.2d at 1381.
13. Most, but not all, equipment lessors will be commercial entities rather than individ-
ual consumers who have bargaining power equal to that of the lessor. See Fraser, supra note 7,
at 608-09. See also the discussion in Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690, 695-96 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982) (rejecting application of warranty liability to a nonmerchant lessor of real property
based in part on the inapplicability of the loss spreading, reliance, and superior product knowl-
edge rationales for imposing liability on manufacturers and merchants).
14. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
1 5. See the discussion and cases cited in Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transpor-
tation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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and property damage." Where personal injury is involved, under any the-
ory of recovery, whether negligence, strict liability, or warranty, Indiana
grants a remedy without requiring privity between the parties. 17 Indiana
courts have liberally construed section 402A of the Restatement Second of
Torts18 in determining who is responsible for injecting a defective product
into the stream of commerce 9 and in determining who is protected as a
user or consumer.
2 0
In Gilbert v. Stone City Construction Co., a federal court applying
Indiana law held that q commercial sale is not an essential element of re-
covery under section 402A.2 1 In Stone City, the court found the lessor of
highway construction equipment liable to an injured bystander because the
lessor was the one who placed the equipment into the stream of com-
merce. 2 As long as the lessor "was engaged in the business of providing
construction equipment to others - even if the corporation pursued other
business as well," status as a lessor and not as a seller was deemed irrele-
vant.2 3 "Therefore, liability under section 402A will attach to one who
places such a product in the stream of commerce by sale, lease, bailment, or
other means." '24 The significance of this holding is not the inclusion of les-
sors in the category of those who inject goods into the stream of commerce,
but the application of strict liability for personal injury on lessors as well as
other business actors.
III. LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC Loss
In Indiana, as in most jurisdictions, economic loss is generally distin-
guished from property and personal injury damages.2 5 One Indiana court
has defined economic loss as "diminution in value of a product and conse-
16. Thiele v. Faygo Beverage, Inc. provides an excellent synopsis of products liability
law in Indiana. 489 N.E.2d 562, 576-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
17. Filler v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1970); Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber
Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965). It should be noted that the plaintiff must fall within the
class of those to whom a duty of care is owed or be a "user" or "consumer" as defined by IND.
CODE § 33-1-1.5-3 (Supp. 1986).
18. IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-3 (Supp. 1986). See also Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prod-
ucts, Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970).
19. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Al E. & C. Ltd., 539 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976); Perfection
Paint Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970).
20. Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 300 N.E.2d 335 (1973). But see
Thiele v. Faygo Beverage Co., 489 N.E.2d 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
21. 171 Ind. App. 418, 357 N.E.2d 738 (1977).
22. Id. at 423, 357 N.E.2d at 742.
23. Id. at 422, 357 N.E.2d at 742.
24. Id. (citations omitted).
25. See the discussion at J. WHITE & R. SUMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 11-5 to -7, at 406-410 (2d ed. 1980) and cases cited
therein.
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quent loss of profits because the product is inferior in quality and does not
work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold."26
The distinction between economic loss and property damage is upheld by
courts because allocation of the risk of economic loss is part of the expecta-
tion interests of the parties. Buyers and sellers, as well as lessees and les-
sors, bargain for the allocation of risk for lost profits, inferior product qual-
ity, and related damage elements when reaching agreement on price and
other contract terms. Absent specific property damage or personal injury,
courts are loathe to remake the contract when the bargain does not meet
the expectations of one party, but the other has fulfilled the contract terms.
The difference between property damage and economic loss is some-
times difficult to identify where the product itself has sustained loss or
damage.
It may therefore be said, as a general rule, that when dam-
age is sudden and calamitous, resulting from an occurrence haz-
ardous to human safety, recovery may be had in tort, but dam-
age resulting merely from deterioration, internal breakage,
depreciation, failure to live up to expectation, and the like, will
be considered economic loss, as to which recovery may be had
only on a contract theory.2
In the majority of states, including Indiana, economic loss is recover-
able only in a contract action. 8 As Justice Traynor explained in the leading
case on the subject, Seely v. White Motor Co.:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recov-
ery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss
is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff
having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests,
rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a
26. Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 895 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff d, 771
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers
for "Economic Loss" Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966) and
Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918
(1966)).
27. Sanco, 579 F. Supp. at 898. See also IND. CODE § 34-4-20-2 (Supp. 1986) which
defines "physical harm" under the Indiana Products Liability Act as "bodily injury, death, loss
of services, and rights arising from any such injuries, as well as sudden major damage to
property. The term does not include gradually evolving damage to property or economic losses
from such damage."
28. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERs, supra note 25. See also Sanco v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F.
Supp. at 896 and cases cited therein. Privity is required to recover under contract or U.C.C.
warranty theories and is therefore a necessary element for recovery of economic loss. See also,
Gregory v. White Truck and Equipment Co., 163 Ind. App. 240, 249-50, 323 N.E.2d 280, 285
(1975) (distinguishing tort and contract warranty concepts).
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manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.
He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries
caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of
safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable
risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of
his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the
product was designed to meet the consumer's demands. A con-
sumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer
with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product
on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk
that the product will not match his economic expectations unless
the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in actions for negli-
gence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physi-
cal injury and there is no recovery for economic loss alone."
Federal courts applying Indiana law have followed Seely noting,
Qualitative defects which merely disappoint the buyer's expecta-
tions of the product's performance do not expose the user or his
property to any risk of physical harm. When a product does not
perform as expected, the buyer's remedy should be governed by
the rules of contract, which traditionally protect expectation
interests.30
The Indiana Supreme Court appears to disagree with Seely in Barnes
v. Mac Brown,- a case involving property damage without personal injury
under the warranty of habitability for newly-constructed residences. The
court rejects the distinction drawn between personal injury and property
damage, but maintains a distinction between these and loss of bargain with-
out attendant property damage or physical injury.
The contention that a distinction should be drawn between
mere "economic loss" and personal injury is without merit. Why
there should be a difference between an economic loss resulting
from injury to property and an economic loss resulting from per-
sonal injury has not been revealed to us. When one is personally
injured from a defect, he recovers mainly for his economic loss.
Similarly, if a wife loses a husband because of injury resulting
from a defect in construction, the measure of damages is totally
29. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (citations omitted).
30. Sanco, 579 F. Supp. at 897.
31. Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co., 264 Ind. 227, 230, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976).
Barnes was cited in Sanco and distinguished on the grounds that it is an action based on
warranty where recovery of economic loss is appropriate, and therefore the court did not have
to choose between warranty and tort concepts as a basis for recovery. Sanco, 771 F.2d at
1085-86.
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economic loss. We fail to see any rational reason for such a
distinction.
If there is a defect in a stairway and the purchaser repairs
the defect and suffers an economic loss, should he fail to recover
because he did not wait until he or some member of his family
fell down the stairs and broke his neck? Does the law penalize
those who are alert and prevent injury? Should it not put those
who prevent personal injury on the same level as those who fail
to anticipate it?32
Justice DeBruler's dissent in Barnes was in line with the reasoning in
Seely and points out that the basis for the action was contract and that the
plaintiffs suffered only economic loss.3 3 Finding no indication that the
builder bargained for liability to subsequent buyers, DeBruler would have
denied recovery to the plaintiffs based on lack of privity."
Disposing of the requirement of showing privity in a con-
tract case involves consideration not present when doing away
with it for the purpose of suing a builder or manufacturer for
injury to person or property caused by a negligently manufac-
ture[d] or dangerously defective product. The determination of
damages recoverable from this defendant-builder must rest in
part upon the expectation about the house created in the minds
of the Barneses at the time of their purchase of the house for the
Shipmans. Those expectations would have arisen out of the bar-
gaining which took place between them. Defendant-builder did
not engage in that bargaining and thereby participate in estab-
lishing the perimeters of any expectations. And the expectations
of bargaining parties end up translated into the purchase price.
Defendant-builder had nothing to do with determining the
purchase price paid by the Barneses. 5
As Justice DeBruler pointed out, the special remedy created for home
purchasers would not extend to an ordinary sale of goods.3 6 The buyer of
goods who suffers economic loss would be left to whatever contract and
U.C.C. warranty remedies had been negotiated and agreed to with the
seller. The lessee, unlike the buyer of goods who suffers economic loss with-
out personal injury or property damage, does not have U.C.C. warranty
remedies against the lessor and is unlikely to have express warranty cover-
age in the usual finance lease agreement.
32. Barnes, 264 Ind. at 230, 342 N.E.2d at 621.
33. Id. at 231, 342 N.E.2d at 621.
34. Id. at 231, 342 N.E.2d at 622.
35. Id.
36. Id.
[Vol. 22
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The plight of the lessee who has defective equipment and has suffered
economic loss is well illustrated in Ridge Co. v. NCR Corp." In this case
the lessee had no warranty remedies against the finance lessor due to dis-
claimers in the lease contract and had no contractual remedies against the
equipment vendor because of lack of privity. Ridge Co. needed a computer
system and decided for various business reasons to lease the equipment
through an established leasing company rather than purchase it outright.
After delivery of the equipment, Ridge claimed numerous defects and defi-
ciencies in the system, including latent defects, which constituted a breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability under section 26-1-2-314 of the
Indiana Code. Ridge claimed economic loss, but suffered no property dam-
age or personal injury as a result of the defective computers.38
Applying Indiana law, the District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana noted that privity of contract remains a necessary requirement for
a claim based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 9 Al-
though the exceptions to the privity requirement found in other Indiana
cases 0 were noted, the record did not support a finding that there was an
agency relationship between the lessee and certain component part manu-
facturers, or that these remote manufacturers had participated in the trans-
action to such a degree that the need for privity between the parties was
obviated."' The court discerned no trend in Indiana law toward elimination
of the privity requirement, notwithstanding the holding in Barnes v. Mac
Brown"2 on the warranty of habitability for residential buildings, and re-
fused to extrapolate or surmise beyond existing case law.' 3 Although the
component part manufacturers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and summary judgment was granted in their favor based on the particular
facts of this case, in appropriate circumstances, U.C.C. warranty protection
may be extended from equipment suppliers to lessees in tripartite finance
lease situations."" As Ridge Co. v. NCR Corp. clearly illustrates, Indiana
courts continue to recognize significant differences between tort and con-
tract actions and between economic loss and personal injury or property
damage. Only in the area of new home construction have Indiana courts
deviated from traditional tort and contract theories of relief.' 5
37. 597 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
38. Id. at 1241.
39. Id. at 1242.
40. Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Corno Feed Products, 173 Ind. App. 682, 366 N.E.2d 3
(1977); Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 179 Ind. App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084 (1979).
41. Ridge Co., 597 F. Supp. at 1242.
42. Barnes v. Mac Brown, 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
43. Ridge Co., 597 F. Supp. at 1243.
44. Id.
45. The precedents for finding liability even where there was no direct privity between
the buyer and a remote manufacturer in Thompson Farm, Inc. v. Corno Feed Products, 173
Ind. App. 682, 366 N.E.2d 3 (1977), and in Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 179 Ind.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE U.C.C. TO LEASES
Article 2 of the U.C.C. and Indiana's statutory version, sections 26-1-
2-101 to -725 of the Indiana Code, explicitly applies to "transactions in
goods."' "6 Although the phrase "transactions in goods" is not defined in the
U.C.C. or used elsewhere in Article 2, it is clear from the Official Com-
ments"' that Article 2 applies to sales and that leases are not within the
purview of Article 2.18
Courts have used at least three theories to apply Article 2 to nonsales
transactions, including leases:49 (1) by claiming leases fall within the phrase
"transactions in goods," 50 (2) by analogizing leases to sales,51 and (3) by
App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084 (1979), can be analyzed within the traditional contract privity
framework and represent expansion rather than elimination of privity requirements. These two
exceptions are discussed infra at notes 126-164 and accompanying text.
46. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-102 (Supp. 1986).
47. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, § 2-2, at 51-52. Indiana did not adopt the
Official Comments to the U.C.C. when its statutory version of the U.C.C. was enacted. IND.
CODE §§ 26-1-1-101 to -206 (Supp. 1986). But see U.C.C. § 2-102 Official Comments (1977).
48. U.C.C. § 2-313 Official Comment 2 (1977) indicating:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made
by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this
Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have
recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct
parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circumstances such as in
the case of bailments for hire, whether such bailment is itself the main contract or is
merely the supplying of containers under a contract for the sale of their contents. The
provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries expressly recognize this case law
development within one particular area. Beyond that the matter is left to the case law
with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with
further cases as they may arise.
But see Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Corno Feed Products, 173 Ind. App. 682, 702, 366 N.E.2d 3,
13 (1977), wherein the court stated, "The warranty provisions of Article 11 of the Uniform
Commercial Code are clearly limited to the sale of goods."
49. Glen Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 220, 541 P.2d 1184,
1188 (1975).
50. Cases which have applied the U.C.C. to leases under the theory that they are "trans-
actions in goods" include: Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Joseph, 641 S.W.2d 753 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1982); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House,
59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910,
316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d
1308 (1979). But see Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972) (if U.C.C. was
intended to cover leases it would say leases and sales); Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp.
671 (D. Md. 1967) (applying Virginia law).
51. Cases which have held that leases are similar to sales and that the U.C.C. may
thereby be applied by analogy include: Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 II. App. 3d 683, 399
N.E.2d 1355 (1980); Belger Cartage Serv., Inc. v. Holland Constr. Co., 224 Kan. 320, 582
P.2d 1111 (1978); All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975); Ad-
dressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 329 A.2d 28 (1974); Baker v. Seattle, 79
Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1988], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/3
1988] TRIPARTITE FINANCE LEASES 603
classifying some leases as sales. 2 Other courts have used multiple theories
to justify the application of Article 2 to leases53 or have simply applied
Article 2 without explanation. 4
A "sale" is "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price."'5 5 Passing of title distinguishes sales from nonsales transactions such
as leases 56 and bailments. 57 The U.C.C. provisions found at section 2-4015'
set forth the requirements for and effect of passing title in a sales transac-
tion. It should be noted that a purchase option in a lease does not necessa-
rily convert the transaction into a sale or secured transaction.59 The intent
of the parties as to whether a particular transaction is or is not a sale is
generally determinative.6" Because the intent of the parties to lease specifi-
cally reserves title in the lessor, leases in Indiana are not subject to the
S.W.2d 46 (1968).
52. Cases which have held that leases may be treated as sales and the U.C.C. applied
directly to the lease transaction include Solomon Refrigeration, Inc. v. Osburn, 148 Ga. App.
772, 252 S.E.2d 686 (1979) (purchase option in lease converted transaction to a sales transac-
tion); Todd Equip. Leasing Co. v. Milligan, 395 A.2d 818 (Me. 1978) (parties acknowledge
transaction denominated as "lease" was really a sale); KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp.,
327 F. Supp. 315 (D. Ark. 1971) (lease treated as a sale and warranty of fitness for particular
use may be applied); Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Everett School, Inc. 9 U.C.C. Rptr. 849
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971) (lease is really an installment sale).
53. Glen Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975).
54. Cases in which the U.C.C. has been applied directly to a lease transaction without
explanation of the court's reasoning include: Chalos Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738
(D.N.J. 1979); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Commodore Cosmetique, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rptr. 164
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (applying the warranty of fitness for particular purpose); Vacuum Con-
crete Corp. v. Berlanti Constr. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 548, 214 A.2d 729 (1965) (applying the
warranty of fitness for particular purpose). But cf. W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580
S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (a lease is not a sale).
55. U.C.C. § 2-106 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-106 (Supp. 1986).
56. Morris v. Lyons Capitol Resources, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(distinguishing leases and security interests); United Leaseshares v. Citizens Bank & Trust,
470 N.E.2d 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining the financing objective of lease transac-
tions); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (distinguishing
lease from other transactions).
57. See Lyon v. Lenon, 106 Ind. 567, 7 N.E. 311 (1886); Webb v. Clark County, 87
Ind. App. 103, 159 N.E. 19 (1927) (defining bailments).
58. IND. CODE § 26-1-2-401(1) (Supp. 1986) provides, in part, for reservation of title in
the goods in the seller as a security interest. As U.C.C. § 2-401 Official Comment I explains,
the purpose of this section is to make clear that a determination as to who holds the title to
goods at any point during the transaction is not determinative of the performance duties owed
by the parties.
59. Morris, 510 N.E.2d at 223-24; McEntire, 471 N.E.2d at 1218.
60. Reissner v. Oaley, 80 Ind. 580 (1881) (intent of the parties determines whether a
transaction is a sale or a bailment); Wayne Pump Co. v. Department of Treasury, 232 Ind.
App. 147, 110 N.E.2d 284 (1953) (intent of parties determines whether a transaction is a sale
or a loan). But cf. Frick Co. v. Walter Cox Co., 107 Ind. App. 402, 199 N.E. 462 (1936)
(words used by parties to describe transaction are not controlling as to effect of transaction).
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provisions of Article 2.61
Indiana courts have not dealt definitively with the application of Arti-
cle 2 to non-sales transactions. Rather, a case-by-case analysis has resulted
in holdings which, taken as a whole, indicate that Indiana has not signifi-
cantly expanded the scope of Article 2 beyond the context of traditional
sales. An Indiana court held that a distributorship agreement was a sale
and was subject to the provisions of Article 262 and, in dicta, in another
case, indicated that the time immediately proceeding the exchange of
money for goods was within the parameters of a sale.6" There has been a
greater willingness by Indiana courts to expand the application of Article 2
to services and items not usually considered "goods" than to expand the
application to nonsales transactions."
In contrast, the provisions of Indiana's statutory version of section
402A of the Restatement Second of Torts6" are applied to lessors. "The
word 'sells' as contained in the text of section 402A is merely descriptive,
and the product need not be actually sold if it has been injected into the
stream of commerce by other means. The test is not the sale, but rather the
placing in commerce. '"66
Precisely because strict products liability is based on tort and not con-
tract law, the requirements of sale and privity are eliminated. Public pol-
icy 6 7 and humanitarian concerns" predominate in the law of torts. In con-
tract law, however, parties are generally left to determine the terms of their
own bargains.69 Contract law protects the right of individuals to limit the
61. See Ridge Co., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Ind. 1984); Neofes v.
Robertshaw Controls Co., 409 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1976) (denying recovery under
U.C.C. warranties to lessee). Cf. Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 171 Ind. Ct. App. 418, 357
N.E.2d 738 (1976) (granting recovery under tort warranties to a lessee). -
62. Moridge Mfg. Co. v. Butler, 451 N.E.2d 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
63. Lane v. Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
64. Baker v. Compton, 455 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (contract for sale and
installation of equipment was within the scope of Article 2 where services were incidental to
sale of goods); Stephenson v. Frazier, 399 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (modular home is
"goods"), trans. denied, 425 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 1981); Helvey v. Wabash Co. REMC, 151 Ind.
App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972) (electricity is "goods"). But ef. Data Processing Servs., Inc.
v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, aft'd, 493 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (devel-
opment of computer software program was service and not goods).
65. IND. CODE § 22-1-1.5-3 (1982).
66. Link v. Sun Oil Co., 160 Ind. App. 310, 312 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1974) (citing Perfec-
tion Paint & Color v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970)).
67. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (implied war-
ranty liability in tort is a matter of public policy).
68. Citizens Gas & Coke Util. v. American Economy Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 998, 1000
(Ind. 1985).
69. Most provisions of the U.C.C. are not mandatory and do not supplant the common
law of contracts unless so specified in the relevant section, thus leaving parties free to shape
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scope of their liability for economic and property losses to those with whom
they are in contractual privity.10
V. U.C.C. WARRANTY PROVISIONS
Article 2 of the U.C.C. provides for three types of product warran-
ties:" express warranties between the parties,7 2 an implied warranty of
merchantability,"3 and an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose. " ' As the Official Comments to each of these actions explain, all three
warranties were derived from the Uniform Sales Act and had a required
privity element.75
An express warranty is a specific affirmation, promise, or representa-
tion with respect to the subject goods which becomes part of the basis of the
bargain between the parties.7 An express warranty must become part of
the contract, even if it is by tacit agreement, because it is part of the basis
of the bargain between the parties. 71 Whether given by agreement between
the parties, description, or sample, an express warranty may be given in any
sales or nonsales transaction.7 1 If a vendor lessor or finance lessor gives an
express warranty to the lessee, this will be enforced as part of the contract
between the parties, but will not be enforced under the U.C.C.79 Privity is
required to bring an action on the contract because express warranties are
part of the bargain between the buyer and seller or between the lessee and
lessor.80
The implied warranty of merchantability applies to every sale of goods
their own bargains. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-1-103 (Supp. 1986).
70. Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 1982) (Indiana law
requires privity of contract for enforcement of warranties in order to protect the contractual
rights of parties to bargain for a limited scope of liability).
71. U.C.C. § 2-312 (1977) and IND. CODE § 26-1-2-312 (1982) provide for a warranty
of title, i.e., that the transfer of goods is rightful and good title is being conveyed. Warranty of
title issues are not relevant to this discussion.
72. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-313 (1982).
73. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-314 (Supp. 1986).
74. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-315 (Supp. 1986).
75. U.C.C. §§ 2-313 Official Comment 1, 2-314 Official Comment 1, 2-315 Official
Comment 1 (1977).
76. Royal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 41 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, § 9-2, at 327-38. See also Nimet Indus.,
Inc. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 419 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (limitations of warranties
must also be express or they are not part of the contract because they were not made part of
the basis of the bargain).
78. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, § 9-3, at 328; Carmichael v. Lavengood,
112 Ind. App. 144, 44 N.E.2d 177 (1942).
79. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, § 9-2, at 327-28.
80. Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 1982).
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where the seller is a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind."'" Even
if the U.C.C. is applied to lease transactions, section 2-314 will presumably
apply only to merchant lessors who deal in goods of the kind being leased.
Arguments in favor of applying warranty liability to lessors are appropriate
for vendor lessors such as car rental agencies and short-term equipment
lessors who can be characterized as "merchants with respect to goods of
[the] kind" being leased.8"
"Merchant" as defined by the U.C.C. is one who "deals in goods of the
kind or otherwise by occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge and skill may be attributed by his employment as an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself
out as having such knowledge or skill."83 Most vendor lessors will fit the
definition of merchant by either dealing in goods of the same kind or by
making representations of particular skill or knowledge relevant to the
leased goods.
Finance lessors, who are likely to have had little or no contact with the
leased goods, may in fact have significantly less skill or knowledge of the
leased goods than the lessee and will rarely hold themselves out as ones who
are skilled or knowledgeable about the goods. It appears that Indiana courts
construe the "merchant" requirement strictly, holding that there is no lia-
bility unless one "is a merchant or manufacturer engaged in the business.
There is no warranty or strict liability for occasional sales by nonmerchants
or nonmanufacturers." 84
Whether the finance lessor is an agent, broker, or intermediary for the
merchant who supplies the leased goods will be a question of fact in each
case. Agency has been recognized in Indiana as a basis for warranty liabil-
81. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-314 (Supp. 1986). This warranty pro-
vides, in essence, that goods shall be fit for their ordinary purpose and use. Privity remains an
element of a cause of action for breach of implied warranties based on contract, but not based
on tort. Corbin v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1984). To the extent that an
action is based on a claim of tortious breach of implied warranties, it is subsumed by and
merges into a claim based on strict liability. Styron v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 644 F.
Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (construing Indiana law).
82. Fraser, supra note 7. See also Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722,
85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970) (where leasing activity was an organized and continuing activity,
lessor was found to be in the business of leasing). Cf. All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or.
App. 319, 600 P.2d 899 (1979) (where a finance lessor was in the business of leasing various
kinds of goods and equipment, but had only leased computer systems on a few occasions, the
lessor was not a merchant with respect to the lease of computer systems).
83. U.C.C. § 2-104 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-104 (Supp. 1986).
84. Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), citing, Royal
Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980); Stapinski v. Walsh Constr.
Co., 272 Ind. 6, 395 N.E.2d 1251 (1979); Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 179 Ind.
App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084 (1979).
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ity in the absence of privity.88
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is codified at
section 2-315 of the U.C.C. and arises where the buyer communicates a
specific intended purpose or use to the seller.88 It is necessary that the buyer
communicate the specific need to the seller87 and that the buyer is in fact
relying on the skill or knowledge of the seller to provide goods which will
meet the stated need. 88 The course of dealing between the parties will affect
the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because over the course of
dealing, the buyer will come to know the product and will rely more and
more on first-hand experience with the product and less on the experience
and expertise of the seller.88
If the communication of specific purpose can be shown, and if the nec-
essary element of reliance is present, the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose will be implied even if it was not part of the express agreement
between the parties. 90 The reliance element and opportunity for fraud or
misrepresentation underlie the public policy of implying warranty liability
for particular purposes even when not part of the express bargain between
the parties.8 '
This warranty was also found at common law, and to the extent that
U.C.C. provisions do not apply to leases, common law warranty liability
may still apply. "It is the rule in Indiana, and it is well settled, that where a
person hires or leases out a chattel which is to be used for a particular
purpose, a warranty will be implied that the chattel is reasonably fit for the
purpose for which it is leased or hired." '92 This common law warranty can
be overridden by the express terms of the bargain between the lessor and
the lessee. It does not extend to the equipment seller where there is no
privity between the lessee and the seller.
A leading case on warranty liability of lessors, Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing, Inc.,9- was based on the common law implied warranty of
fitness for ordinary use.
85. See discussion of Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Corno Feed Products, infra text accom-
panying notes 126 and 156.
86. Jameson Chemical Co. v. Love, 401 N.E.2d 41, modified as to att'y fees, 403
N.E.2d 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
87. Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahren, 170 Ind. App. 84, 352 N.E.2d 774 (1976).
88. Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d
188 (1972).
89. Royal Business Machines, 633 F.2d at 46.
90. Id.
91. Filler v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1970).
92. Pointer v. American Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 573, 577 (S.D. Ind. 1968). See also Bass
v. Cantor, 123 Ind. 444, 24 N.E. 147 (1890).
93. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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To illustrate, if a traveler comes into an airport and needs a car
for a short period and rents one from a U-drive-it agency, when
he is put in the driver's seat his reliance on the fitness of the car
assigned to him for the rental period whether new or used usu-
ally is absolute. In such circumstances the relationship between
the parties fairly calls for an implied warranty of fitness of use,
at least equal to that assumed by a new car manufacturer. The
content of such warranty must be that the car will not fail
mechanically during that period.9
Although the nature of this common law warranty has been found to be no
different in sales or bailments (leases), it does not protect the lessee's expec-
tation interests for a specific use.9" The lessee who suffers economic loss
without property damage or personal injury gains no remedy against the
lessor other than the remedy to sue on the contract. Likewise, the lessee
gains no remedy outside the contract to seek recovery from the remote
equipment supplier or manufacturer.9"
VI. PRIVITY REQUIREMENTS UNDER INDIANA LAW
The right to enforce a contract or bring an action based on breach of
warranty in contract is generally limited to those parties who are in privity
with the defendant. 97 Furthermore:
[R]esearch discloses not one decision under Indiana law in
which a plaintiff brought a personal injury action against a de-
fendant with whom he was not in privity of contract that
reached a result favorable to the plaintiff on the theory of
breach of implied warranty sounding in tort.98
Indiana has abolished the privity requirement for personal injury actions
based on negligence or strict liability in tort:
The requirements of privity have been abolished by this Court
and the Court of Appeals for products liability and contractor
94. Id. at 449, 212 A.2d at 777.
95. Id. at 453-54, 212 A.2d at 777, 779 (citing Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4,
6 (2d Cir. 1964), wherein the court held that reference to "sales" was descriptive of the situa-
tion rather than determinative of the scope of available remedies).
96. Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 179 Ind. App. 102, 112, 384 N.E.2d 1084,
1092 (1979) (citing Gregory v. White Truck & Equip. Co., Inc., 163 Ind. App. 240, 323
N.E.2d 280 (1975)).
97. Citizens Gas & Coke Util. v. American Economy Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 998, 1001
(Ind. 1985); Essex v. Ryan, 446 N.E.2d 368, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Two exceptions to the
privity requirement in addition to the special case of the implied warranty of habitability will
be discussed below.
98. Theile v. Faygo Beverage Inc., 489 N.E.2d 562, 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
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liability involving personal injury caused by a product or work in
a condition that was dangerously defective, inherently dangerous
or imminently dangerous such that it created a risk of imminent
personal injury. 9
Even where personal injury occurs, an action brought under a claim of
breach of warranty based in contract must show that the plaintiff was a
party to the contract, in privity with the defendant, or within the class pro-
tected by section 26-1-2-318 of the Indiana Code as a third party benefi-
ciary to a warranty. 0 0 Indiana has adopted Alternative A, the most restric-
tive version of the three choices under U.C.C. § 2-318 for Third Party
Beneficiaries Under Warranties, Express or Implied. 1'0 Alternative A limits
protection to members of the buyer's household or family and guests in the
home of the buyer.'0 2
The Indiana Supreme Court refused to abolish the privity requirement
where property damage without concomitant personal injury was in-
volved. 10 3 In Citizens Gas & Coke Utility v. Economy Insurance Co., a
water heater was installed without the floor drain necessary to carry away
excess water if the heater overflowed, became overpressurized, or leaked.' 4
Property injury resulted when the heater overflowed while the home occu-
pants were away. Because the parties had stipulated that only property
damage was involved, the court did not consider whether the escaping hot
water in the absence of a proper drain might have caused personal injury
from scalding or falling on a wet floor.' 06
Although the difference between personal injury and property dam-
age' 0 6 was recognized as the result of fortuitous circumstances in Barnes v.
Mac Brown & Co.,'01 and might well have been so in the Citizens Gas case,
99. Citizens Gas, 486 N.E.2d at 1000.
100. Wilson v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 383, 388 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
Usually a contract warranty claim is brought in a case involving personal injury where the
two-year tort claim statute of limitations has run. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Federal Cartridge
Corp., 466 N.E.2d 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Lane v. Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980).
101. IND. CODE § 26-1-2-318 (1982).
102. Corbin v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1984) (does not include re-
mote or second-hand buyers); Lane, 407 N.E.2d at 1178 (does not include relatives who are
not members of the buyer's household).
103. Citizens Gas, 486 N.E.2d at 1000.
104. Id. at 999.
105. Id.
106. Property damage as used herein refers to actual damage to the goods as a result of
their defective condition and is to be distinguished from economic loss of bargain. See supra
notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
107. 264 Ind. 141, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976). Perhaps this is a further indication that
Indiana courts view the implied warranty of habitability as a distinct area of the law with little
19881 609
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the court refused to abolish the privity requirement in the case of negli-
gence involving only property damage.1 08 The Citizens Gas court did not
cite Barnes,09 but did cite Essex v. Ryan as supportive of its position.110
Essex v. Ryan"' further complicates the privity issue. The case in-
volves a claim by heirs against a surveyor for negligence in carrying out a
land survey under the terms of a personal service contract between the sur-
veyor and the deceased. The precedential value of Essex is difficult to assess
because (1) it involves a personal services contract which is clearly not
within the scope of the U.C.C., (2) there is no privity of contract between
the heirs and the surveyor or between the heirs and the deceased, and (3)
the heirs had no expectation interest or any other nexus with the surveyor
which could be recognized as forming a basis for recovery. The court right-
fully protected the surveyor's interest to be free from liability to those with
whom he did not bargain and to those whom he could not reasonably fore-
see that a duty of care would be owed.'
Where economic loss in the nature of loss of bargain is claimed, the
general rule in Indiana and the majority of jurisdictions requires privity of
contract in order to maintain a cause of action.11 3 The same conclusion was
reached by federal courts interpreting Indiana law in Sanco, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co.,"' where both the District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that there is no
negligence-based cause of action, that is, a cause of action which does not
require privity of contract between the parties, that grants a remedy for
purely economic loss.
[I]f a negligence cause of action were available, Sanco could re-
cover despite any effective disclaimer of warranty under Ind.
Code 26-1-2-316, or any failure of Sanco to adhere to the notice
requirements of Ind. Code 26-1-2-316. [T]his result would re-
present an unwarranted extension of the traditional boundaries
of tort law into an area that [the] legislature, by enacting the
Uniform Commercial Code, has provided with a finely tuned
mechanism for dealing with the rights of the parties to a sales
transaction with respect to economic losses. We are confident
bearing on other types of warranty claims.
108. 486 N.E.2d at 1001.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
112. Richards v. Goerg, 179 Ind. App. 102, 120, 384 N.E.2d 1084, 1092 (1979); Dagley
v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965).
113. Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893; (S.D. Ind. 1984), affd, 771 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1985).
114. 771 F.2d at 1085 (quoting Sanco, 579 F. Supp. at 897-98).
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that the Supreme Court of Indiana would view unfavorably any
encroachment of tort law on the sales scheme of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 115
Where pure economic loss in the nature of loss of bargain, lost profits,
or lost business opportunity is the subject of an action, privity remains
firmly entrenched as a prerequisite to the pursuit of warranty remedies. 1 6
While this is generally not a problem in a sales transaction, the privity re-
quirement leaves the lessee with inadequate remedies. A lessee faced with a
defective telephone system which has failed to perform as promised by the
vendor may discover that the finance lessor made no warranties for the
equipment and therefore- is not liable and that lack of privity precludes an
action against the vendor of the equipment.
Although the difference between personal injury and property damage
may be the result of fortuitous circumstances which does not warrant differ-
ent treatment in the law, the reasoning of the court outside the context of
the implied warranty of habitability'1 7 has consistently emphasized "hu-
manitarian principles,"" 8 public health and safety," 9 and concern for the
innocent injured bystander, 2 ° implying an analysis under tort rather than
contract theories. Where there is only loss of bargain, in the case where
leased equipment fails to perform as expected, contract theory, with its at-
tendant requirement of privity and express or implied warranties, offers the
only remedy. Indiana courts have given no indication that this distinction
will be obviated.
Privity remains firmly entrenched in Indiana law as a prerequisite to
recovery for any kind of personal, property, or economic damage claimed in
an action brought on a contract. Where personal injury is involved, tort law
will allow recovery for the plaintiff in either a negligence or strict products
liability action without privity of contract.'' As a result, the lessee is faced
with a particularly narrow range of options. If the lessee is injured and falls
within the class protected by section 402A, the lessee may recover.' 22 But if
115. Id.
116. Citizens Gas & Coke Util. v. American Economy Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 998, 1001
(Ind. 1985); Ridge v. NCR Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Candlelight
Homes, Inc. v. Zornes, 414 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
117. Barnes v. Mac Brown, 264 Ind. 141, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
118. Citizens Gas, 486 N.E.2d at 1000; J.1. Case v. Sandefur Co., 245 Ind. 213, 197
N.E.2d 519 (1965).
119. Hiatt v. Brown, 422 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
120. Lane v. Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
121. Thiele v. Faygo Beverage, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 562, 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
122. IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-3(a) (Supp. 1986) limits the class of potential plaintiffs to
users and consumers whom the defendant could reasonably foresee might be subject to harm
from the defective product. Thiele, 489 N.E.2d at 585. See Neofes v. Robertshaw Controls
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the lessee suffers no personal injury, privity leaves only the lessor as a possi-
ble defendant for an action brought on the lease contract or based on com-
mon law implied warranty for a particular purpose. The lessee whose com-
puter does not work or whose truck is a "lemon" will probably find that the
financial institution which funded the lease disclaimed all warranties and
that the lessee is left with the property "as is."
In addition to the exception carved out in the area of the implied war-
ranty of habitability, 128 Indiana courts have recognized two exceptions to
the privity requirement in sales contexts: (1) an exception based on tradi-
tional concepts of agent and principal which allow extension of the status of
buyer or seller to more than one individual or entity12 4 and (2) an exception
based on actual participation in the transaction to such an extent that eq-
uity absolves the privity requirement. 25
Indiana maintains a clear distinction between contract and tort actions,
requiring the plaintiff to establish substantially different elements in order
to establish a prima facie case in each kind of action. The exceptions which
allow a plaintiff to bring an action sounding in contract without proving
privity of contract are narrowly defined. Most significantly, the exceptions
to privity do not eliminate privity, but recognize circumstances where the
plaintiff is brought within the privity framework on the basis of agency or
actual participation.
VII. THE AGENCY EXCEPTION TO THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
Traditional concepts of principal and agent have been used to extend
U.C.C. warranty remedies from a remote manufacturer to an injured
buyer. Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Corno Feed Products'26 is a 1977 Indiana
Court of Appeals decision where an implied agency relationship between
the dealer, Triple T Grain and Fertilizer, Inc., and the manufacturer,
Corno Feed Products, was held to bestow the status of "seller" on both the
dealer and the manufacturer, thereby bringing both into the transaction as
parties liable on the warranties made to the buyer, Thompson Farms.
Thompson Farms is particularly instructive for the typical tripartite
lease situation because Corno, the dealer and financing agent for the sale,
brought an action against the buyer for default under the terms of the fi-
Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (denying the claim of a lessee brought on a
contract warranty due to lack of privity between the lessee and a component manufacturer).
123. Barnes v. Mac Brown, 264 Ind. 141, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
124. Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Corno Feed Products, 173 Ind. App. 682, 366 N.E.2d 3
(1977).
125. Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 179 Ind. App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084
(1979).
126. Thompson, 173 Ind. App. at 682, 366 N.E.2d at 3.
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nance and security agreements, which granted no warranty rights to
Thompson. 127 The buyer brought a counterclaim based on breach of express
and implied warranties as well as a tort claim for negligent design and
manufacture of hog houses and a feeding system.' 28 Although it was the
dealer, Triple T, which constructed and sold the hog houses and feeding
system to Thompson, Corno was the designer, component manufacturer,
and promoter of the complete hog feeder program. 12 9 Notwithstanding the
fact that the products bore Triple T's logo, the court found an agency rela-
tionship existed sufficient to impose warranty liability on Corno based on
these facts: (1) Corno promoted the hog feeding system in its own name,
(2) placed its name on promotional materials and product packaging, (3)
paid for Triple T's advertising expenses, (4) required the dealer to submit
all contracts for financing to Corno for Corno's approval, and (5) made
direct contact with the buyer when design problems developed.' 30 In addi-
tion, the dealer and the manufacturer had a course of dealing with respect
to the hog feeder system which indicated that Triple T was acting as a
special agent for Corno in the promotion and sale of the product. 131
The court defined agency as "a relationship which results from a) the
manifestation of consent by one person to another, to undertake some busi-
ness b) on his behalf or in his name, and subject to his control, and c) the
authority and consent of the other for such person to so act."' 32 As a gen-
eral rule, agency may be inferred from the circumstances, including course
of dealing between the parties or creation or assent to circumstances or
conditions which give rise to the reasonable expectation that one is acting as
the agent for another.' "An agency will, at times, be implied from the
circumstances, in order to protect the rights of innocent parties, even where
no contract of agency in fact exists." 3
Corno contended it was not a seller because its role in the transaction
was that of financing agent. 135 Unlike other jurisdictions, the Indiana court
held that Corno could be both a seller and a financing agent in the same
transaction. 3 ' The court recognized that complex transactions may involve
127. Id. at 684, 366 N.E.2d at 5.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 685, 366 N.E.2d at 6.
130. Id. at 695-96, 366 N.E.2d at 11-12.
131. Id. at 699, 366 N.E.2d at 12.
132. Id. at 694, 366 N.E.2d at 10 (citing Lincoln Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Fort
Wayne v. Barker, 110 Ind. App. 1, 34 N.E.2d 190 (1941)).
133. Id. at 694, 366 N.E.2d at 12.
134. Foss-Schneider Brewing Co. v. McLaughlin, 5 Ind. App. 415, 418-19, 31 N.E. 838,
839 (1892).
135. Thompson, 173 Ind. App. at 699, 366 N.E.2d at 13.
136. Id. at 700, 366 N.E.2d at 13, distinguishing its holding from In re Sherwood Diver-
sified Services, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and Atlas Industries, Inc. v. NCR
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several parties and that individual parties may perform multiple roles in the
same transaction. 37 Although it acknowledged that other courts have sim-
ply imposed additional responsibilities on finance agents, the Indiana court
found no need to do so because it deemed Corno to be a seller and therefore
fully accountable to the buyer under the express and implied warranty pro-
visions of the sales contract." 8
In holding that the hog houses and feeding system were goods under
the terms of the U.C.C., 39 the court noted that it was not applying the
U.C.C. by analogy to this transaction."" It is a reasonable inference, there-
fore, that the court thereby intended not to extend Indiana's enactment of
the U.C.C. beyond its terms."' This holding is significant in the tripartite
lease situation because it is unlikely that the finance lessor would be found
also to be a seller and therefore within the ambit of the Thompson Farms
decision.
In Candlelight Homes, Inc. v. Zornes, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Indiana's privity requirement in an action by a buyer to recover for eco-
nomic loss to a mobile home from a remote manufacturer."" Where there
was no evidence of any direct dealing between the buyer and the manufac-
turer, the court concluded that the mere existence of a manufacturer-dealer
relationship did not establish an agency relationship sufficient to allow the
buyer to recover for economic loss from the manufacturer." 3
Thompson Farms""' represents the use of agency principles to extend
the status of seller to more than one entity. Agency may also be used to
extend the status of buyer to more than one individual. A 1983 case, Wil-
son v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., involving injury to an employee from
an explosion in a turbine pump, was brought against various remote suppli-
ers and manufacturers under both contract and tort theories." 5 Due to the
expiration of the statute of limitations for the strict liability claims, the
injured employee attempted to prove breach of contractual warranty." 6 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana failed to
find the requisite privity of contract, holding that the employer, but not the
Co., 216 Kan. 213, 531 P.2d 41 (1975).
137. Thompson, 173 Ind. App. at 700, 366 N.E.2d at 13.
138. Id. at 701-02, 366 N.E.2d at 14.
139. Id. at 705, 366 N.E.2d at 14-15.
140. Id. at 701 n.9, 366 N.E.2d at 14 n.9.
141. Id.
142. 414 N.E.2d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
143. Id. at 982.
144. Thompson, 173 Ind. App. 682, 366 N.E.2d 3 (1977).
145. 582 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
146. Id. at 385-87. See also Thiele v. Faygo Beverage, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 562 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986) (employee not considered user/consumer within § 402A).
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employee, might bring a cause of action sounding in contract. 7
In 1986, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana relied on agency principles to supply the requisite privity to allow
an employee of a corporation to bring a contract warranty action against a
remote manufacturer.1 4 8 Recognizing the role of the employee in the daily
activities of the corporation, the court concluded, "[ifn essence, plaintiffs
are the corporation."1 4 The court relied heavily on the holding in Hart v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. that:
[Miost businesses are carried on by means of the assistance of
employees and that equipment or supplies purchased by employ-
ers will in actual use be handled by the employees, who in this
respect may be said to stand in the shoes of the employer. "
The results in these two cases are not easily reconciled. Although the
plaintiff in Roberts'5' was the sole shareholder in a small business operated
much like a sole proprietorship, and the plaintiff in Wilson52 was part of a
large enterprise, both were employees of corporations. The emphasis on per-
sonal contact with the party whose nexus to the transaction is supplied by
agency principles in Thompson Farms,' Richards v. Goerg,'5 ' Ridge v.
NCR"' and Roberts v. Homelite'"I is the only consistent thread running
through these cases. Courts will imply an agency relationship, but appear to
look to personal contact and direct dealing before they will do so.
Where there is an actual or implied agency between the seller and the
manufacturer, despite lack of privity between the buyer and the remote
manufacturer, Indiana courts have found sufficient basis to apply U.C.C.
warranty remedies directly between the buyer and the manufacturer. The
agency exception eliminates the inequity of allowing a remote party such as
the manufacturer to avoid warranty liability when it has as principal reaped
the benefit of its agent's tripartite finance lease where the equipment vendor
has supplied goods to the lessor who is acting for the lessee.
147. Wilson, 582 F. Supp. at 388.
148. Roberts v. Homelite Div. of Textron, 649 F. Supp. 1440 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
149. Id. at 1443.
150. 214 F. Supp. 817, 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (quoting Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54
Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960)).
151. Roberts, 649 F. Supp. at 1443-44.
152. Wilson v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
153. Thompson Farms v. Corno Feed Products, 173 Ind. App. 682, 366 N.E.2d 3
(1977).
154. Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 179 Ind. App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084
(1979).
155. Ridge Co. v. NCR Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
156. Roberts, 649 F. Supp. at 1440.
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VIII. THE PARTICIPATION EXCEPTION TO THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
Even where an agency relationship cannot be found, participation in
the sales transaction can be sufficient to bring the parties within the privity
parameter. In Richards v. Goerg Board and Motors, Inc.,' a buyer of a
houseboat brought an action against the dealer and the manufacturer of the
boat for breach of express and implied warranties under the U.C.C. The
lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer based
on a finding of no privity between it and Richards. The court of appeals
reversed, finding there were sufficient factors to bring the manufacturer into
the transaction." The court held that both the dealer and the manufac-
turer of the boat "must be considered sellers under the [Uniform Commer-
cial] Code." 59 Factors which the court identified included (1) that the
buyer and the manufacturer talked about the potential purchase at a boat
show, (2) that the buyer inspected the goods and received a demonstration
at the manufacturer's plant, (3) that the buyer discussed repair problems
directly with the manufacturer, and (4) that the carpenter's certificate and
warranty were mailed directly from the manufacturer to the buyer. 180 The
court noted that "[e]xcept for the direct exchange of payment, the relation-
ship between [the buyer] and [the manufacturer] involved all the attributes
of a sales transaction relevant to the warranty."''
The significance of the decision in Richards12 is that only economic
loss was involved. There was no personal injury or other property damage
claimed which might lead the court, based on policy or humanitarian con-
cerns, to try to fashion a remedy for the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court
used the agency principles discussed in Thompson Farms'3 to find suffi-
cient privity to allow the plaintiff to enforce the implied warranty provisions
found in the U.C.C. The level of personal involvement in the sale between
Richards and the boat manufacturer was significant.
The Richards decision expands the agency exception in two ways: by
finding an exception based on participation without the formal attributes of
an agency relationship and by applying the exception where only economic
loss was involved. Both of these dimensions are applicable to tripartite fi-
nance leases. In the case of the typical tripartite finance lease, the lessor
will usually go to the premises of the equipment seller and talk with the
seller directly about the goods. The lessee may have a demonstration of the
157. Richards, 179 Ind. App. at 102, 384 N.E.2d at 1084.
158. Id. at 112, 384 N.E.2d at 1085.
159. Id. at 113, 384 N.E.2d at 1092.
160. Id. at 104-06, 384 N.E.2d at 1088-89, 1092.
161. Id. at 112, 384 N.E.2d at 1092.
162. Id. at 102, 384 N.E.2d at 1084.
163. Thompson, 173 Ind. App. 682, 366 N.E.2d 3 (1977).
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equipment's operation or may inspect the goods, but the lessor who is the
buyer will rarely do so. In some cases, the lessee may address questions or
problems directly to the seller, depending on maintenance and service
arrangements.
The difficulty in enforcing warranty liabilities in this situation is that
while express representations about the nature, capacity, or qualities of the
goods may have been made, they were not made by the seller to the buyer.
Likewise, any implied warranties flow from the seller to the buyer and not
to the user/lessee. When the product fails, resulting in economic loss to the
lessee, privity requirements preclude any direct action against the equip-
ment supplier. The fact that the transaction is characterized as a lease, in
addition to any warranty disclaimers made by the lessor, usually precludes
recovery against the lessor. As in Richards v. Goerg,'" both the supplier
and dealer/lessor in the tripartite lease situation seek to avoid the status of
seller.
Participation in the transaction, and in some cases an agency relation-
ship between two of the three parties, can be demonstrated in most tripar-
tite lease situations. The difficulty for the typical lessee is that lack of priv-
ity with the equipment supplier is only half the problem. Unless the lease is
brought within the scope of the U.C.C., any recovery is limited to common
law warranty. Allowing the lessee to use the exceptions to privity based on
agency or participation in the transaction might bring the equipment sup-
plier into the lease transaction. It does not change the nature of the transac-
tion from a lease to a sale.
On the other hand, if the lessor is viewed as the agent of the lessee in
transacting the sale with the equipment supplier, the lessee then is brought
into the sales transaction and U.C.C. remedies are available to the lessee.
The Richards'" exception could be applied to qualify both the lessee and
the lessor as buyers for the purposes of U.C.C. warranty remedies. Particu-
larly where the lessee has personally selected the equipment, has dealt di-
rectly with the supplier prior to the execution of the sale documents with
the financing agent, and has arranged for delivery directly to the lessee's
place of business, the requirements for participation in the transaction suffi-
cient to categorize both the lessor and lessee as buyers might be found.
Precisely these elements were missing in Ridge v. NCR, 6 which pre-
vented the court from applying the theories of agency and participation to
the component part manufacturers. Because the lessees (1) had no direct
contact with the component part manufacturers, (2) thought they were
purchasing NCR equipment and not equipment made by the component
164. Richards, 179 Ind. App. at 102, 384 N.E.2d at 1084.
165. Id.
166. Ridge Co. v. NCR Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
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part manufacturers, and (3) did not involve the component part manufac-
turers in the transaction negotiations, the exceptions founded on the law in
Thompson Farms and Richards v. Goerg could not be applied.'67
The counter argument is that to include two parties as buyers, there-
fore placing them within the scope of warranty protection, might be outside
the scope of the bargain. Indiana courts have long been protective of the
parties' own allocation of economic risk and benefit and will not set aside a
bargain merely because the parties are of unequal bargaining power." 8
Further, because it is presumed that the lessee, lessor, and equipment sup-
plier are all business entities and not individual consumers, they ought to be
left to vagaries of their own bargains and not look to the courts for protec-
tion from bad contracts.
The reality is that leasing is a business transaction that has outgrown
its legal underpinnings."6 9 Just as courts and legislatures in the 1960s and
1970s recognized that the modern marketplace did not compound with
traditional concepts of privity between buyer and seller and therefore devel-
oped strict products liability, now it is time to re-examine the laws of sales
and bailments. Carte blanche application of the U.C.C. to lease transac-
tions is one solution, but does more than is needed. Rather, a more efficient
solution is to grant to lessees in tripartite lease situations a remedy against
the equipment supplier with whom the lessee had direct contact. Where the
participation elements set forth in Richards v. Goerg"10 (such as personal
contact, inspection or demonstration of the goods, or participation in service
and repair arrangements) can be shown, equity requires that the lessee who
suffers economic loss be allowed to seek a remedy from the equipment sup-
plier. By leaving the finance lessor out of the picture, the lessor's role as
financing agent is not obfuscated, and unnecessary anxiety over potential
liability does not drive up the cost of credit.
Because the law of implied warranties is largely a matter of public
policy, changes in commerce and industry may dictate changes in the
law. 1 Granting implied warranty protection for economic and property
loss, as well as personal injuries to the commercial lessee, comports with
notions of fairness and justice. Parties are still free to make their own bar-
gains; the lessee and the equipment supplier may negotiate the allocation of
risks and benefits in the transaction. The difference is this: where there is
direct dealing between the parties, the lessee may, within the terms of the
167. Id. at 1242.
168. Id.
169. Carlin, supra note 8, at 850.
170. Richards, 179 Ind. App. at 102, 384 N.E.2d at 1084.
171. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (indicating
that the change in strict products liability law was due in part to the court's recognition that
changes in commerce and industry should result in changes in public policy).
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sale agreement between the lessor and the equipment supplier, directly en-
force whatever warranty remedies would be available from the seller to the
buyer. The equipment seller is still free to disclaim and limit warranties
within the confines of U.C.C. § 2-318 and the requirements for good faith
and fair dealing. 7 ' The lessee, however, ought to be able to enforce the
sales contract in lieu of the lessor and without the need to establish privity
of contract directly with the equipment seller.
The advantage of allowing this exception to privity in a nonsales trans-
action is that it preserves the intent of the parties as to the respective roles:
the seller provides the goods or equipment to a lessee/buyer not a financier/
buyer; the lessor provides financing and avoids involvement in the underly-
ing procurement transaction; and the lessee/buyer obtains the needed item
without having to sacrifice warranty protection or performance expectations
for credit financing. Such a change does no more than is necessary. Not all
lease transactions would be brought within the scope of the U.C.C. Where
lessees stand in the role of buyer, the application of U.C.C. remedies on
behalf of the lessee rather than the lessor is an equitable solution.
172. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-318 (1982).
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